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A Behavioral Model of Bureaucracy* 
KENNETH SHUN-YUEN CHAN 
Saint Mary's University 
I. Introduction 
From a traditional viewpoint, government growth is thought to be a response 
to population expansion and the increasing complexities of the economy 
engendered by externalities and various other market failure. In the literature, 
Buchanan [1] first explains the decision-making process of the government 
by postulating a utility function for the bureaucracy that has income level and 
size of bureaucracy as arguments. Thus, this form of utility function is similar 
to that of a profit maximizing firm. (Note that a hyperbolic utility function 
implies that government bureaucrats will maximize wages above the market 
rate times the size of output of bureau services. This is identical to profit 
maximization.) To achieve these goals, the government bureaus which behave 
as monopolies must under-produce government services. Hence at the utility 
maximizing output, it is impossible to have over-size bureaus.1 To amend 
this, we have to assume that for the utility function of the bureaucracy, more 
"favor" is attached to the size of the bureaucracy than to the income of the 
bureaucrats. Niskanen [6] justifies the latter by assuming the sole objective of 
government bureaucrats is to maximize the "budget allocation". He then 
demonstrates that this assumption would result in an over-expansion of 
bureaucracy. 
Tullock [7; 8] has noted that the above analysis has an obvious drawback 
in that voters participation is omitted. The introduction of voters in our 
analysis also introduces competition into the public sector. Downs [3] argues 
that the sole objective in the decision-making process of government bureau- 
crats is to maximize political support; that is, ensure re-election. Hence, when 
government bureaucrats are faced with a group of conscientious voters, 
*I am indebted to Gordon Tullock, Nancy Ripley and Sandra Dow for helpful discussions 
and comments. I alone bear any responsibility for errors. 
1. Even when perfect "political" competition among bureaucrats is introduced, the bureau 
will produce at P = MC; we can never get over-size bureaus! 
1188 
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defined to be those who support only efficient government, competition for 
re-elections will force government bureaus to maintain optimal size. Conse- 
quently, over-size bureaus can only occur with a group of unconcerned and 
dependent voters,2 defined as voters that prefer more government service 
rather than efficient government service. 
To my knowledge only Tullock [8] has attempted to explain the growth of 
bureaucracy as the interactions between bureaucrats and voters. He argues 
that the votes of the bureaucrats would be partially directed towards raising 
their own salaries. Gradually, as the size of bureaus becomes larger, the 
bureaucracy members take a larger and larger share of the voting constituency; 
thereby further reinforcing the size of bureauracies. And so on. 
Since most governmental activities are based on some invisible form of 
contractual agreement (social contracts) between the government and her 
constituents, this paper will analyze the growth of bureaucracy from the 
viewpoint of behaviorial interactions of voters and bureaucrats. A static 
framework is employed. The concept of a "social" contract curve will be 
introduced. A set of sufficient conditions for the growth of bureaucracy is de- 
rived in this paper which hopefully will remove some of the afore-mentioned 
shortcomings in the literature. 
II. Analytical Framework 
Let t be the amount of tax per unit of government service. Let the D-D curve 
in Figure 1 in the (t, Q) space be the demand curve for government service 
We assume the following institutional constraints on the economy: (1) the 
size of bureaucracy provides additional utility for bureaucrats.3 (2) the money 
2. We can get a group of unconcerned and dependent voters in two ways. (1) When all the 
public services are indivisible, voters can become unconcerned. Since public services cannot be 
priced directly to the recipients, payment for public services is often divorced from the receipt of 
such services. Consequently, there is a tendency for voters to prefer more government services 
[2, 61]. And (2) A continuous dose of government services can create in the public an "overde- 
pendence" on the government to solve their problems. Thus, a welfare state may generate a 
society of dependent individuals. Trudeau, the Prime Minister of Canada, reminds his constitu- 
ents that they cannot expect as a right, a free lunch. This is essentially the same as the "moral 
hazard" problem. In the literature, Mundell [5] argues that government services can destroy the 
moral fibre in the society such as private incentive and personal responsibility etc. He illustrates 
this by the example of relief payments: "It is widely believed that public provision for the needy 
has reduced private charity (or at least changed its goals), but more important, it has altered the 
character of the recipients of it. It is one thing for society to arrange to help out the crippled, ... 
and the deprived. . . . It is another thing to create in healthy individuals the expectation that the 
government has the responsibility to compensate them for personal actions that have turned out 
badly. . . Just as a mother who is tempted to remind her child every time he is in the act of 
forgetting eventually learns that a continually reminded child can become a forgetful one" [5, 
185]. 
3. Since bureaucrats are forbidden to pursue for profit, bureaucrats have to look for other 
means (e.g. to increase the size of bureaus) to maximize their utility. In the literature, the 
explanation for that is as follows: (1) suppose the allowable budget varies with the size of the 
bureau, then bureaucrats must prefer a large bureau so that they can have a large "expense 
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wage of bureaucrats is institutionally restricted not to go below the market 
wage rate regardless of the size of bureaucracy.4 And, (3) the amount of work 
for each governmental position is rigidly specified independent of the wage 
level of the employee and/or the size of bureaucracy.5 Thus, the utility func- 
tion of the bureaucracy consists of two components: wage rate and the size of 
the bureaucracy. 
In Figure 1, the average cost (AC) and marginal cost (MC) curves are 
drawn with the assumption that the bureaucrat's salary is equal to the con- 
stant market wage rate. In Figure 1, we map the utility contour of the 
bureaucracy onto the (t,Q) space. The vertical distance above the AC curve 
must be proportional to how much the bureaucrats' money wage exceeds the 
market wage rate. Therfore, the utility contours must lie above the AC curve. 
We assume there is perfect "political" competition among bureaucrats. 
The maximum utility level the bureaucrats can achieve would be the utility 
contour that is tangent to the D-D curve since the latter represents the 
amount of (t, Q) that voters can afford to pay.6 
Let us next discuss the preference function of the voters for government 
bureaus. Voters always prefer more government service and a cheaper tax 
rate from government bureaus. Hence the preference contours of voters take 
a positive slope and are convex as shown in Figure 1. 
We assume there is perfect "political" competition among voters. The 
maximum utility the voters can achieve is the preference contour that is 
tangent to the AC curve since the latter represents the amount of (t, Q) that 
bureaucrats are willing to work given the institutional constraints. 
One would expect that in this set of voters' preference contours, govern- 
ment efficiency must be taken into account. Hence, for a group of conscien- 
tious voters, the slope of one preference contour must be tangent to the AC 
curve where the MC curve cuts the D-D curve.7 This is illustrated by point A 
account" [6]; (2) bureaucrats may prefer a large bureau for the sake of bureaucratic "aethetics": a 
devoted bureaucrat who cannot appropriate the profit he makes for the bureau, would prefer to 
have a "perfect" bureau rather than an "economical" bureau [4, 244]; and, (3) there are consid- 
erably more prestige and power working in a large bureau (ibid.). 
4. Since institutions do not explicitly recognize the gain of bureaucrats from the size of 
bureaucracy, the official opportunity cost of hiring a government employee must be his market 
wage rate. 
5. This is often due to the high adjustment cost involved in changing job specifications. 
Causal observations would support this. Each lengthy job description sheet is carefully written 
up. Any minor changes often involve a series of bureaucratic "red-tape." 
Constraints (2) and (3) guarantee the existence of "feather-bedding" jobs in the government. 
Also, constraint (3) implies the amount of disutility from work is fixed. Hence, as the size of bu- 
reaucracy (level of money wage) increases holding the level of money wage (size of bureaucracy) 
constant, the level of utility of bureaucrats must increase. Further, it would draw a "pool" of 
unemployed bureaucrats from other sectors of the economy queuing for those limited positions. 
6. Note that this is different from Niskanen's model which assumes the bureau has monopoly 
power. Consequently, the D-D curve is the marginal budget curve for the bureau since the 
bureau is able to appropriate its sponsor's consumer surplus. Our model, however, assumes 
perfect "political" competition among bureaucrats. 
7. We can regard the preference contour of conscientious voters as combinations of (t, Q) that 
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in Figure 1. As for a group of unconcerned and dependent voters, the 
marginal rate of substitution must bias in favor of the size of bureaucracy. 
Hence, the preference contour must be tangent to the AC curve to the right of 
point A (e.g. point B in Figure 1). 
From these two sets of contours, we can now derive a social contract 
curve (SCC) which is a locus of points of tangency of the two sets of contours. 
As mentioned earlier, we consider most governmental activities are based 
on an invisible social contract between bureaucrats and voters. This, together 
with our assumption of perfect political competition among voters and bu- 
reaucrats, indicates that the static solutions of the model must be where the 
marginal rates of substitution of (t,Q) are identical for both parties. Suppose 
lobbying is allowed before election (i.e. recontracting); then, when the initial 
values of (t,Q) are off the contract curve, there exists an adjustment of (t,Q) 
towards the SCC which would be acceptable to both parties; hence both 
parties enter into contractual agreement. 
Note that in our model, the initial values of (t, Q) determine where the 
economy would be on the SCC. Since the voters' preference contours are 
always positively sloped, as the economy moves from the initial point to the 
SCC, an increase (decrease) in government service must be accompanied by 
an increase (decrease) in bureaucrat's salary. 
Let us next discuss some sufficient conditions for the bureaucracy to 
overexpand.8 
Proposition 1 
With the above institutional constraints on the economy, the possibility for 
the bureaucracy to overexpand exists. 
The above institutional constraints imply that as the size of bureaucracy 
expands at the market rate, the level of utility increases. Furthermore, since 
the marginal rate of substitution between the size of bureaucracy and money 
wage are not zero, therefore, as we move along the AC curve in Figure 1, the 
slope of the bureaucracy's utility contour must be strictly less than the slope 
of the AC curve at the points of intersection. 
Let us first examine the case where government bureaucracy is faced 
with a group of conscientious voters. Since, at A, the slope of the voters' 
preference contour is tangent to the AC curve, as we move to the right along 
the AC curve, the slope of the voters' preference contours must be strictly less 
than the slope of the AC curve at the points of intersections. Hence, the 
SCC-where the two sets of contour lines are tangent to each other--must be 
to the right of point A. Consequently, the possibility for the bureaucracy to 
keep a constant level of consumer surplus. Obviously, the "highest" preference contour must be 
tangent to the AC curve where MC cuts the D-D curve. 
8. By over-size or over-expansion we mean the Q is to the right of point A in Figures 1 and 2. 
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overexpand exists. As for the case of unconcerned and dependent voters (i.e. 
the slope of a voters' preference contour is tangent to the AC curve at B), the 
SCC will cut the AC curve to the right of point B. Obviously, the possibility for 
overexpansion exists. 
The implication of proposition 1 is: even with the presence of perfect 
"political" competition among voters and bureaucrats, the possibility for over- 
expansion of bureaucracy still exists. Since the size of bureaucracy is an argu- 
ment in the bureaucracy's utility function and there are various institutional 
constraints, voters are ready to accept bureaus with some degree of over-size 
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Proposition 2 
With a group of unconcerned and dependent voters, the possibility for the 
bureaucracy to overexpand exists regardless of the type of institutional con- 
straints. 
This rather obvious proposition is illustrated by Figure 2. Suppose govern- 
ment bureaucrats are indifferent to the size of bureaucracy; and are only 
interested in the level of their salaries (in other words, the marginal rate of 
substitution of salary increase to size of bureaucracy is zero everywhere). 
These bureaus are now faced with a group of conscientious voters. Under 
such circumstances, the SCC must pass through point A in Figure 2 and take a 
negative slope. Government bureaus can never become over-size! The possi- 
bility of an over-size government can only occur in this case when these 
bureaus face a group of unconcerned and dependent voters. The SCC then 
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III. Conclusions and Discussions 
In the conventional wisdom, the lack of competition in the government 
sectors, together with the institutional constraints on the economy, seems to 
be the main cause for the growth of bureaucracy [2; 4; 6]. However, our 
analysis shows that when voters participation is taken into consideration, the 
lack of competition in the government sector is neither necessary nor suf- 
ficient for the growth of bureaucracy. It is not necessary, since our proposi- 
tions 1 and 2 discuss the growth of bureaucracy under the assumption of 
perfect competition among voters and bureaucrats. It is not sufficient because 
when the bureau possesses the monopoly power, bureaucrats would max- 
imize utility by choosing the utility contour that is tangent to the "offer 
curve" of the voters. The static solution which depends on the initial values of 
(t, Q) and the shape of the offer curve, may not necessarily be an oversize 
bureau. 
Finally, the model can be extended to aid in explaining the deficit finance 
behavior of the government. Consider the situation where the marginal rates 
of substitution between voters and bureaucrats are not equal at a certain (t, Q) 
and the AC curve has effectively confined the movements of (t, Q). In this 
instance, both groups are frustrated. If the short-run cost of deficit financing 
is small, it is possible for the government to run a transitory budget deficit 
and lower the AC curve so that both the voters and the bureaucrats can reach 
the SCC. (Note that the amount of budget deficit can be regarded as a 
negative fixed cost). 
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